Modulation of Direct Payments: A crossed analysis of incremental schemes by Boulanger, P.
  1 
Modulation of Direct Payments: 
A crossed analysis of incremental schemes 
Boulanger P.
1
1 Sciences Po, Groupe d’Economie Mondiale, Paris, France 
 
Abstract— The progressive attempt and implementation of 
direct payment limitations since the 1992 CAP reform has 
developed a “modulation mechanism” aiming to transfer funds 
from market support and direct payment schemes (CAP first 
pillar) towards rural development measures (CAP second 
pillar). Under the 2007-2013 European financial perspectives, 
the annual 5% rate of modulation is expected to increase. The 
paper focuses on the financial impacts of four scenarios 
together with corresponding political and institutional 
feasibilities. 
The paper imposes on itself three sound constraints: (i) 
expanding modulation should not jeopardise the future in-
depth reform of the direct payment regime, (ii) modulation 
should be compulsory and consistent with rural development 
financial needs, and (iii) present direct payment per farm 
should not be capped or subject to complex and differentiated 
reduction rates. Then, the paper suggests adopting a dynamic 
and uniform modulation rate to be increased by 1 percent per 
year from 2009 and then by 2 percent during the final step 
reaching 10 percent in 2012 (2013 financial year). It would 
deliver certainty to farmers and contribute to an efficient use 
in European spending, with no need for a controversial equity 
instrument. 
Direct payment reductions raise subsidiarity and budgetary 
issues which should be discussed within the European budget 
review. Considering the modulation mechanism as a related 
past-policy tool, renewed European decision making process 
and actors should outline from 2009 a new paradigm in direct 
payment regime. Since farmers are increasingly becoming 
entrepreneurs, the sooner an agreement on the CAP beyond 
2013 is reached, the better. 
Keywords—  direct payments, rural development, 
European budget. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
As the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) follows a 
dynamic process, prompt adjustments are the purpose of the 
2008 health check. The magnitude and modalities of cuts in 
direct payments seem to be one of the most political 
sensitive issues. There is still a deep budgetary imbalance 
between the first and the second pillar despite the current 
modulation mechanism which allows transfers of funds 
from the former towards the latter. Criticisms on 
distribution become all the more relevant when recipients of 
first pillar subsidies are involved [1]. Ongoing transparency 
in payment beneficiaries exacerbates this allocation 
concern. Direct payments, even decoupled, still reflect 
historical policies that are inconsistent with modern society 
willingness [2]. Furthermore, in spite of expected world 
market evolution, European budgetary overruns may lead to 
mandatory direct payment cuts.  
Thus, what are the political feasibility and financial 
effects of various modulation schemes within the current 
financial perspectives (2007-2013), if there is a need to 
transfer higher amounts of European funds from first to 
second pillar? 
Considering earlier modulation development and current 
systemic constraints, financial outcomes from competing 
short-term incremental schemes are assessed and discussed. 
II. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
A. Modulation’s progressive implementation  
The modulation appeared in the CAP glossary with 
reflections leading to the 1992 CAP reform. In February 
1991, considering inequity in support distribution, the 
Commission anticipated that modulation was likely to 
dominate discussions. The 1992 reform did not limit direct 
payments granted to cereal, oilseeds and protein crops via 
restrictions on set-aside compensation as initially envisaged 
[3]. Capping the total amount a farm may receive was also 
withdrawn. A maximal number of head was adopted for the 
main animal compensatory payments –i.e. special premium 
for male bovines and suckler cow premium. 
The Agenda 2000 (1999 CAP reform) widened the 1992 
shift. Partial compensation of agreed guaranteed price 
decreases impacted uniformly farm recipients. Again, the 
Commission failed in concretising an equity tool in direct 
payment allocation. However, it succeeded in implementing 
a modulation principle, formally defined as the transfer of 
funds from the first to the second CAP pillar. It was then 
voluntary, by up to 20%, and aimed at funding targeted 
rural development accompanying measures (the United 
Kingdom (UK) and France applied this provision even so 
presently only the UK and Portugal are allowed to do so). 
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Table 1 Compulsory percentage reduction in direct payments:  
Proposals vs. Adoption (2013 financial year) 
EC1998: Communication from the European Commission regarding 
legislative proposals for Agenda 2000 (March 1998). It would introduce 
voluntary modulation and compulsory degressive modulation. The Agenda 
2000 only implemented the former. 
EC2002: First MTR of the Agenda 2000 proposals from the Commission 
(June 2002). In order to consider labour force, a 5 000 euro franchise 
would be applied for farms employing up to 2 full time annual working 
units. For each additional employed annual working unit, the franchise 
would be increased by some 3 000 euros.  
EC2003: Second MTR of the Agenda 2000” proposals from the 
Commission (January 2003). The EC2003 figures sum the percentage of 
direct payment reduction in order to finance development measures (the 
modulation rate would be similar for all holdings receiving more than 5 
000 euros per year: 6%) and the percentage of direct payment reduction in 
order to finance future reform on common market organizations (the 
reduction rate would differ for holdings receiving less or more than 50 000 
euros: 6.5% applied to the former, 13% applied to the latter).  
Payment size / scenario  EC1998  EC2002  EC2003  2003 
Reform 
x≤ 5 000 €  0%  0%  0%  0% 
5 000 € <x<10 000 €  0%  20%  12.5%  5% 
10 000€ ≤x< 50 000€  0%  20%  12.5%  5% 
50 000€ ≤x< 100 000€  0%  20%  19%  5% 
100 000€ ≤x<  200  000€  20% 20% 19% 5% 
200 000€ ≤x<  300  000€  25% 20% 19% 5% 
x≥ 300 000€  25%  100%  19%  5% 
 
The Mid Term Review (MTR) of the Agenda 2000 made 
the modulation compulsory. Further to the MTR 
Commission proposals in June 2002 and January 2003, the 
Luxembourg agreement (2003 CAP reform) made a low 
down compromise between the two previous MTR 
proposals (cf. Table 1). It did not ceil direct payment a farm 
may receive. It introduced a uniformed flat modulation rate 
of 3% (in 2005), 4% (in 2006) and 5% (from 2007 to 2012), 
for all direct payments from the first pillar with a 5 000 euro 
franchise in order to privilege support for small farms. This 
discretionary threshold provision is in fact a lump amount 
applied to any direct payment recipient. The effective 
modulation rate is therefore inevitably lower than the 
nominal one [4].  
B. Institutional framework and opening debate 
The Brussels European Council of 24-25 October 2002 
established a budgetary ceiling for the whole 2007-2013 
financial perspectives: CAP first pillar expenditures shall be 
kept below the 2006 amount (previously established by the 
Berlin European Council of 24-25.03.1999). Inflation shall 
give no more than a single one percentage annual increase. 
In order to respect such a constraint, a financial discipline 
mechanism shall reduce direct payments. Rural 
development expenditures of the 27 Member States are 
exempted of any decrease as well as direct payments for the 
12 new Member States (NMS) and outermost regions.  
The inter-institutional agreement of 16 May 2006 on the 
2007-2013 financial perspectives enabled Member States to 
set up their own national rural development programmes but 
stated far below the Commission financial proposal. 
Regarding current price estimations, funds allocated to the 
2007-2013 second CAP pillar are fixed 21.7% below the 
Commission request, 11.6% if considering compulsory 
modulation and financial transfers from cotton and tobacco 
direct payment targeting (two compulsory sector-based 
financial reorientations agreed on April 2004). 
C. Scenarios’ specification 
Four extra-modulation scenarios are run assuming that 
during the 2008 CAP health check an agreement over 
increasing EU15 modulation within the 2007-2013 financial 
period is reached, with no cuts due to potential financial 
discipline mechanism or to a minimum annual payment -a 
lower limit being also put forward by the Commission. The 
extra-modulation would start by 2009 and then would be 
allocated to rural development funds from the 2010 
financial year. There is systematically a 5 000 euro 
franchise. Indicative figures on the distribution of direct 
payments are by size of amount received for the 2005 
financial year (paid from 16 October 2004 to 15 October 
2005). Direct payment national amounts in 2010, 2011, 
2012 and 2013 financial years are taken from the Council 
Regulation 319/2006 of 20 February 2006. Scenario-
corresponding budgetary reallocations between Members 
States generated by the modulation mechanism are assessed 
with an algorithm optimisation model. 
The EC2007 scenario considers the November 2007 
communication from the Commission preparing for the 
health check: a dynamic and uniform modulation rate 
increasing by 2 % per year reaching 13% in 2012 plus an 
equity tool (cf. Table 2). The EP2008 scenario considers 
March 2008 Report from the European Parliament on the 
CAP  health check, settled by Lutz Goepel: a uniform 
modulation rate status quo (5%) plus an equity tool. The 
EC2008 scenario considers the May 2008 Commission 
legislative proposals for the health check: the EC2007 
uniform modulation rates plus a lower equity tool. An 
alternative scenario (ALT) considers an increase in 
modulation rate of 1% per year and 2% during the final step 
reaching thus 10% in 2012 without any equity tool [5].  
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Table 2 Compulsory percentage reduction in direct payments:  
Scenarios on health check output (2013 financial year) 
EC2007: Communication from the EC (November 2008) 
EP2008: Report from the EP (March 2008) 
EC2008: Legislative proposals from the EC (May 2008) 
ALT: Alternative scenario (uniform modulation rate with 10% max) 
Payment size / scenario  EC2007  EP2008  EC2008  ALT 
x≤ 5 000€  0%  0%  0%  0% 
5 000€ <x<10 000€  13%  5%  13%  10% 
10 000€ ≤x< 50 000€  13%  6%  13%  10% 
50 000€ ≤x< 100 000€  13%  6%  13%  10% 
100 000€ ≤x< 200 000€  23%  7%  16%  10% 
200 000€ ≤x< 300 000€  38%  8%  19%  10% 
x≥ 300 000€  58%  9%  22%  10% 
 
Four limits regarding empirical analysis should be 
highlighted. First, this static analysis does not consider 
direct payment redistribution induced by national 
decoupling implementation neither holding restructurings. 
Second, distribution effects from Common market 
organisations reform modalities implemented from 2005 are 
excluded. Third, distributional data used leave out some 
sectors where direct payments are paid to producer 
associations and not directly to final beneficiary (premiums 
for tobacco and bananas). Fourth, British and Portuguese 
voluntary modulations are not taken into account. 
III. RESULTS 
A. The state of the (dis)Union: facts and lessons 
Even if payment ceiling by farm carries a sound political 
signal in terms of equity, it has never been implemented 
(individual support limits are implemented in the United 
States since 1970). On the one hand, some States would be 
particularly affected by this provision regarding historical or 
institutional specificities. On the other hand, it would lead 
to discriminate larger farms guided by economies of scale 
strategy, to thwart farm businesses’ plans, and would distort 
competition. Also, degressive rates with brutal thresholds 
would lead some farms to change their legal structure or 
split their holding in order to bypass discretionary 
thresholds. 
Regarding redistribution issues, areas specialised in 
products historically eligible to high direct payments 
(mainly cereal, oilseeds and protein crops) shall be 
confronted to larger cuts. These areas shall maintain a 
fraction of the modulated amount if they are involved in 
rural development programmes as part of national strategy 
plans.  
Except for the 5  000 euro franchise integrated in the 
modulation mechanism, and in spite of previous 
Commission proposals, improving equity in the direct 
payment scheme has never been put into practice. Previous 
developments allow us to list policy recommendations 
regarding both distributional matters. Direct payment per 
farm shall not be capped or be subject to complex and 
distinctive modulation rates. Modulation shall consider a 
minimum franchise amount, avoid any threshold effects and 
be compulsory. Any further increase in the compulsory rate 
shall be reflected by a corresponding decrease in voluntary 
ones. Financial reallocation between Members States of 
modulated amounts is a sensitive issue examined in the 
discussion section of this paper. Last but not least, a revised 
article 69 of Council Regulation 1782/2003 would enable 
financing within the first pillar sustainable rural 
development measures.  
The modulation mechanism challenges distribution 
matters between pillars. Those within the first one shall be 
partially sorted out by the national implementation of the 
decoupling scheme and by a revised article 69. This latter 
has no effect on the European budget and allows targeted 
measures short-term funding within the first pillar. It runs 
however again the current two pillar dichotomised CAP. 
Previous recommendations, ceteris paribus, will not 
jeopardise a further in-depth reform of the direct payment 
regime. Indeed, the key issue is direct payment targeting, 
not transitory modulation scheme adjustments. 
B. Financial outcomes from competing scenarios 
Roughly 74% of EU15 direct payment beneficiaries 
receive annually less than 5 000 euros. These 75% receive 
13.5% of EU15 direct payment total amount. In other 
words, modulation is applied to 26% of EU15 holdings 
which receive more than 85% of EU15 direct payments. 
EC2007, EP2008, EC2008 and ALT scenarios would cut 
EU15 direct payments by respectively 8.4%, 4.2%, 7.2% 
and 5.3%. Differentiating uniform modulation and equity 
tool, the former would cut EU15 direct payments by 6.8%, 
3.4%, 6.8% and 5.3%, the latter by further 1.6%, 0.8% and 
0.4% respectively (cf. Table 3).  
Table 3 Total cuts in direct payments delivered by tool 
(million euros, 2010-2013 financial period) 
EC2007: Communication from the EC (November 2008) 
EP2008: Report from the EP (March 2008) 
EC2008: Legislative proposals from the EC (May 2008) 
ALT: Alternative scenario (uniform modulation rate with 10% max) 
EC2007 EP2008 EC2008  ALT 
11 622.5  5 792.3  9 915.5  7 296.5 
mod.. equity  mod.  equity  mod.  equity  mod.  equity 
9 415.1  2 207.3  4 706.9  1 085.4  9 415.1  500.4  7296.5  - 
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Member States would be affected in different proportions 
regarding both modulation and upper cuts. Main affected 
countries by the uniform modulation would be France, 
Germany, the UK, Spain and Italy with a reduction 
representing respectively 28.3%, 19.3%, 14.2%, 10.9% and 
7.6% of the total European modulated amount. Considering 
the equity tool, Germany and the UK would be the main 
countries affected by EC2007 (and EC2008) scenarios with 
respectively (53.1%, 51.6%) and 15.2% (16.5%) of total 
upper cuts. Observing that EP2008 equity tool is softer and 
starts with payments over 10 000 euros, financial impacts 
by Member State are close to those from uniform 
modulation. France, Germany, the UK, Spain and Italy 
would be the main affected countries with cuts representing 
respectively 26.7%, 24.4%, 15.7%, 10% and 7.3% of EU15 
total equity tool cut. This outcome may have been the 
starting point of the European Parliament proposal along 
with a main concern on homogeneous national increase in 
direct payments cuts (cf. Table 4). 
The ALT scenario would more than double the EU15 
modulated amount while affecting uniformly the percentage 
increases by Member State without interfering with 
economies of scale and competition distortions.  
Table 4 Percentage increase in modulation amount referring to status quo 
scenario by Member State (2010-2013 financial period) 
EC2007: Communication from the EC (November 2008) 
EP2008: Report from the EP (March 2008) 
EC2008: Legislative proposals from the EC (May 2008) 
ALT: Alternative scenario (uniform modulation rate with 10% max) 
MS / scenario  EC2007  EP2008  EC2008  ALT 
Belgium 104.0%  17.8%  101.0%  55.0% 
Denmark 138.1%  23.8%  108.6%  55.0% 
Germany 229.1%  29.2%  128.5%  55.0% 
Greece 104.5%  9.9%  101.5%  55.0% 
Spain 132.6%  21.2%  107.4%  55.0% 
France 104.9%  21.8%  101.3%  55.0% 
Ireland 102.6%  16.7%  100.7%  55.0% 
Italy 153.9%  22.2%  112.3%  55.0% 
Luxembourg 101.4%  18.1%  100.4%  55.0% 
Netherlands 242.1% 23.7%  129.1% 55.0% 
Austria 119.3%  13.4%  104.2%  55.0% 
Portugal 132.8%  23.1%  108.5%  55.0% 
Finland 101.5%  13.2%  100.3%  55.0% 
Sweden 124.0%  20.9%  105.6%  55.0% 
U. Kingdom  150.3%  25.5%  112.4%  55.0% 
EU15 average  146.9%  23.1%  110.7%  55.0% 
stand.  deviation  44.2%  5.2% 9.4% 0.0% 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. On the efficient use of savings 
Before providing rural development budgetary 
allocations, concrete budgetary needs are required. The 
identification of European priorities is quite wide -climate 
change, renewable energy, water management and 
biodiversity -and would deserve programme specifications 
prior to credit allocations. During the 2000-2006 rural 
development programming period, less than three fourth of 
EU15 credit was effectively spent (with high national 
disparities from 49% for Greece to 85% for Finland).  
Funds released rapidly by extra-modulation may interfere 
already established rural development’s national strategy 
plans for the 2007-2013 period. Increasing European funds 
for rural development shall induce an increase in national 
expenditures. Therefore decreasing co-financing rates for 
Member States would release national expenditures. By 
contrast, the present keeping out of the co-financing 
principle granted to first pillar spending may not be 
irreversible. However, dealing with co-financing rates and 
subsidiarity has to be part of a more general agreement on 
European budget as planed from 2009, after the CAP health 
check.  
By not being mistaken regarding the coming European 
calendar and by considering short-term commitments, an 
efficient use of CAP spending argues in favour of a low 
increase in modulation rate. 
B. On the financial reallocation between Member States 
Should savings stay in the generating Member State or be 
reallocated to others? Due to the imbalanced distribution of 
direct payments between Member States and the total 
amount involved, this sensitive question has always been 
related to direct payment cuts. The 2003 reform introduced 
restrictive provisions limiting financial redistribution. 
Each Member State keeps automatically one-percentage-
point of the total modulated amount he generates. The 
remaining amount is then allocated among Member States 
in accordance with national agricultural area, agricultural 
employment and gross domestic product per capita in 
purchasing power. This allocation key involves only EU15, 
Member States being ensured to maintain at least 80% of 
the national modulated amount (90% for Germany). All 
scenarios present an effective financial reallocation rate of 
12.7%-12.9% of the total modulated amount (cf. Table 5). 
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Table 5 Financial reallocation: gain/loss and percentage return  
by Member State (million euros, 2010-2013 financial period) 
EC2007: Communication from the EC (Nov. 2008) 
EP&EC2008: Report from the EP (March 2008) and legislative proposals 
from the EC (May 2008) – as well as a status quo scenario 
ALT: Alternative scenario (uniform modulation rate with 10% max) 
MS / scenario  EC2007  EP&EC2008  ALT 
Belgium  -35.3 80.0% -17.6 80.0% -27.4 80.0% 
Denmark  -65.7 80.0% -32.9 80.0% -50.9 80.0% 
Germany  -181.6 90.0%  -90.8  90.0%  -140.8 90.0% 
Greece 196.5  197.3%  94.7  194.0% 150.7 196.3% 
Spain  414.9 140.4% 209.6 140.8% 322.7 140.5% 
France  -532.6 80.0%  -266.3 80.0%  -412.7 80.0% 
Ireland  -67.4 80.0% -33.7 80.0% -52.2 80.0% 
Italy  189.2 126.3% 100.1 127.9% 149.1 126.8% 
Luxembourg  -2.3 80.0%  -1.1 80.0%  -1.8 80.0% 
Netherlands -14.6  92.5%  -3.5 96.4%  -9.6 93.6% 
Austria  166.1 222.1% 79.3  216.5% 127.1 220.5% 
Portugal  232.4 280.8% 109.8 270.9% 177.3 278.0% 
Finland  11.3  109.3%  7.3 111.9%  9.5 110.0% 
Sweden  -43.9 80.0% -21.3 80.6% -34.0 80.0% 
U.  Kingdom  -267.0 80.0%  -133.5 80.0%  -206.9 80.0% 
 
As amounts released by upper cuts would stay within the 
generating Member State, equity tools would have no 
reallocation effect, as the increases in modulation amount 
set up in the EC2008 scenario. This latter disposal, 
participating to the complexity of the mechanism, was 
introduced in the May 2008 legislative proposals in order to 
facilitate a compromise regarding a short-term increase in 
direct payment cuts. Once again, it emphasises systemic 
budgetary considerations when direct payment reductions 
are envisaged. 
C. On the integration of the NMS in a modulation scheme 
Although the 2003 CAP reform excludes the NMS of any 
modulation mechanism during the phasing-in period, 
legislative proposals integrated them as soon as they reach 
90% of EU15 level in 2012 (2013 financial year, Bulgaria 
and Romania being exempted). In view of the increase in 
modulation applied in EU15, it fixes for EU10 a 3% 
uniform modulation rate plus the common equity 
instrument. It would release roughly 100 million euros fully 
returned to the initiator Member States. Considering 
heterogeneous farm structures, Czech Republic and 
Hungary would generate respectively 32.5% and 30.8% of 
EU10 total modulated amount; Poland would contribute to 
less than 18%.  
Even concluded the phasing-in period, NMS budget 
committed to the second pillar will be higher than to the 
first one. Arbitrary and differentiated modulation schemes 
between EU15, EU10 and EU2 would undermine 
legitimacy and efficiency of such a mechanism. Indeed, 
modulation is a tool adapted to the current direct payment 
regime which shall not be the one implemented beyond 
2013. Therefore it would be more pertinent not to involve 
the 12 NMS in a related past-policy tool.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The implementation of a compulsory modulation with 
the 2003 reform opened a more general reorientation of the 
CAP direct payments. It may challenge the 2007-2013 
distribution matters between pillars, not within the first one 
through the performance of a controversial equity tool. The 
national implementation of the decoupling scheme and a 
revised article 69 are more appropriate to do so. 
In order to give farmers certainty and ensure an efficient 
use of spending, a deep increase of modulation rate shall not 
occur within the current financial perspectives. 
Nevertheless, a slight uniform one shall rather respect 
budgetary ceilings and be consistent with the progressive 
implementation of a new policy set than truly strengthen 
rural development measures within the CAP or prevail over 
a new paradigm in the direct payment regime. 
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